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Abstract 1 Fail-stop protocols 
Fail-stop cryptographic protocols are characterized 
by the property that they terminate when an ac- 
tive attack is detected, rather than releasing infor- 
mation valuable t o  the attacker. Since such a con- 
struction forces attacks (other than denial-of-service) 
to  be passive, the protocol designer's concerns can be 
restricted to  passive attacks and malicious insiders. 
A significant advantage of such protocols is that by 
stopping and not attempting to  recover, proofs about 
protocol behavior and security properties are greatly 
simplified. 
This paper presents a generic method of converting 
any  existing (cryptographic) protocol into a fail-stop 
one, or designing new protocols to  be fail-stop. Our 
technique uses cryptographic hashes to validate se- 
quences of messages by reflecting message dependen- 
cies in the hash values. An informal proof of cor- 
rectness is given. We apply it to  an early version of 
Netscape's Secure Socket Layer (SSL) cryptographic 
protocol. We also suggest a possible application to  
TCP  streams as a high-performance alternative to  
the per-packet authentication of IPSEC. 
Tlie modified protocols require small increases in 
message size and the number of cryptographic op- 
erations relative to the initial non-fail-stop protocols. 
Cryptographic protocols are widely used in many ad- 
vanced applications, such as electronic banking, net- 
worked software distribution, and wireless personal 
communications systems. Due t o  the complexity of 
conditions they may encounter, careful reasoning and 
formal means such as proofs are used t o  validate the 
design of a cryptographic protocol. Such validation is 
easier if the set of threat conditions is reduced. If this 
reduction is via assumptions which ignore reality, the 
validation becomes worthless when the assumptions 
are falsified. Techniques resulting in the construction 
of protocols which by design reduce the complexity of 
threat conditions are thus extremely attractive. 
One such idea is a fail-stop cryptographic protocol, 
recently introduced by Gong and Syverson [FS]: 
A protocol is fail-stop if any attack inter- 
fering with a message sent in one step will 
cause all causally-after messages in the next 
step or later not to  be sent. 
As Gong and Syverson show, fail-stop protocols pos- 
sess a very useful security property, namely: 
active attacks cannot cause the release of 
secrets within the run of a fail-stop protocol 
The fail-stop property lets a protocol designer re- 
strict his or her concerns to  passive (eavesdropping) 
attacks, a significant reduction in the class of threats 
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cure behavior in the face of active attacks on security. 
1.1 Specifying fail-stop behavior 
Syverson and Gong state the following specifications 
for a fail-stop protocol: 
1. The content of each message has a header con- 
taining the identity of its sender, the identity of 
its intended recipient, the protocol identifier and 
its version number, a message sequence number, 
and a freshness identifier. 
information in each message of the protocol. This 
has several weaknesses. First, the size of the mes- 
sages increases. Second, the amount of encryp- 
tion/decryption required also increases [PET]. Third, 
and perhaps most consequential, there is more plain- 
text for an attacker to  mount known plaintext attacks 
[LG90] [PPC]. 
Instead of including all the information of their spec- 
ification in each protocol message, we can rely on 
one-way hash functions, such as MD5 [MD5] or SHA 
[SHA] to  preserve the sequencing of the protocol mes- 
sages. 
2. Each message is encrypted under the key shared A Messages B 
between its sender and intended recipient. 
3. An honest process follows the protocol and ig- 
nores all unexpected messages. 
4. A process halts any protocol run in which an ex- 
pected message does not arrive within a specified 
timeout period. 
The above specifications assume that the two commu- 
nicating parties share a secret encryption key used 
with a symmetric key cryptosystem (such as DES 
[FIPS46]). 
The freshness identifier can be a nonce issued by the 
intended recipient or a time stamp (if the clocks are 
assumed to be securely and reliably synchronized- 
but see [LG92]). 
1.2 Outline of this paper 
Section 2 presents our method for chaining the mes- 
sages of a protocol run. This makes the messages 
sequenced and non-reusable outside the context of 
t,his protocol run, thereby making message tamper- 
ing and replay attacks impossible [PSI. Section 3 
gives a detailed example of the methods applied to 
the SSL cryptographic protocol. Section 4 proposes 
applications to a large class of protocols, those which 
provide reliable message streams. Section 5 makes 
some observations about the method, and addresses 
some potential criticisms. Section 6 concludes the 
paper and summarizes its contributions. 
2 Message chaining 
The initiator of the protocol run starts by sending the 
first message including all the aforementioned infor- 
mation (some of which might already be included in 
the original protocol). Additionally, a hash of the en- 
tire message (including the new fields) is sent. That 
value is also kept as local state. 
The responder verifies these values and then proceeds 
with the normal flow of the protocol. From there on, 
each message exchanged contains the one-way hash 
result of the new message and the state of the sender 
of that particular message. The receiver of each mes- 
sage calculates the hash of the message and his state 
and compares it with the hash value he received. If 
they're not the same, then some active attack is as- 
sumed to be taking place. 
Naturally, the hash values cannot be sent along with 
the message in the clear; an attacker could tamper 
with those. There are three alternatives to  securing 
them: 
1. Sign the hash values with one's private key, if 
the peer is known to have one's public key, when 
using a public key cryptosystem (such as RSA 
[RSA] [RSAl]). 
2. Encrypt the hash value with a shared secret key 
using a symmetric cryptosystem. 
Fail-stop cryptographic protocols, as specified by 3. Use keyed hashes (where the key has to be used 
Gong and Syverson, require repeating considerable in each hash function application). Care must 
be taken to  use a strong way of keyed-hashing Also, the chance of the State chancing to  be the 
[BCK]. same as the one a t  a previous step of the proto- 
col is negligible (approximately ( 1 / 2 ) ~ / ~ ,  where 
n is the length in bits of the output of the hash 
2.1 The hash function function). 
Here we assume that the hash function used has four 
desirable properties: 
Collision resistance: an attacker cannot create 
another message with the same hash value. 
Entropy preservation: the effect that some value 
has in the hash result does not disappear, at least 
not before a reasonably large number of applica- 
tions of the hash function. 
Non commutativity: reordering the messages 
will make the results invalid. 
However, manipulating the State to  some partic- 
ular value means that the previous round of the 
protocol has been tampered with successfully l .  
This in turn (because of the reasons given above) 
means that the round before that has been suc- 
cessfully attacked. 
Following this argument, the attacker would 
have to affect the first message in the protocol. 
More specifically, he would have to substitute it 
with another message from a previous or paral- 
lel run of the protocol which uses the same Key. 
The reasons this is not possible are: 
Given subset of the input to the hash function 
and the result,, an attacker can not find what the the first message can not be tampered with, 
missing input bits are. since it involves usage of a secret key and 
the hash function is collision free 
Depending on the particular protocol, additional it contains enough information to  distin- 
properties might be required from the hash function guish it from any other first-message of the 
[RJA]. same protocol 
2.2 Correctness of our method The above are not intended as a formal proof of cor- 
rectness of our method, but rather as a line of rea- 
Keeping in mind that the verification a t  each step of soning which we believe is sufficiently convincing. 
a protocol is of the form: 
H(Key, State, Message) 2 Message.Hash 2.3 Other attacks 
There is one final point of concern: although it is There are three methods of active attacks a malicious . impossible for an attacker to inject a message in the 
entity can attempt: 
middle of a protocol run under our scheme, it is still 
possible to use a captured message as the first mes- 
Find the key. we have made the (weak, sage in a protocol. Of course, the protocol must allow 
as hash functions go) this attack by message insertion in the first place, and 
that this is not possible. such an attack is precluded if it is impossible for an 
2. Inject a new message such that the verification attacker the hash from a message (he 
succeeds.  hi^ means that the attacker is caps- can discard that field if it's a keyed hash for example, 
ble of creating collisions on the hash function but not if it's encrypted in CBC mode [CBCI with all 
even when a secret quantity (the Key) is in- message 
volved. Again, this is a relatively weak assump- If the protocol designer is also worried about insider 
tion we have already made. attacks, he or she should ensure that any valuable 
pieces of information (such as a digital signature) is 
3. Affect the State either of the legitimate inseparable from the hash value. For example, in the 
P~~~~~~~ parties> so that a message can case of a digital signature, one would use the hash 
be replayed. Manipulating the State to  some de- value in the signature 
sired value - even if it were possible - would not 
the attacker to a new message We assume the attacker does not have access to the inter- 
his own, since the Key used is unknown to him. n a l ~  of either of the legitimate protocol parties. 
3 An example: Netscape's SSL 
An early version of thc SSL protocol [SSL] included 
the following messages: 
Here, A and B arc a client and a server respectively, 
Kt, is B's public key, K, is A's public key, CA is 
a certificate of A's public key, K i l  denotes signing 
with 4 ' s  sccret key, Kab is a sessio~i secret key and 
Nil is a nonce/challenge. There are more messages 
in the prot,oc:ol, but as they are irrelevant to client 
aut,hent,ic:ation we will ignore them. 
This version of the SSL protocol has a flaw, noted 
in [PET]. If C is a malicious server and A tries to  
communicate wit,h it ,  then C can impersonate A to 
another server B: 
5. A + C: {CA, {Nt,)KT1}~oc 
6. C -+ 13: {CA, { N b } K - ~ ) ~ , ,  
at, which point C has convinced B that he is A. Ap- 
plying our niethod u ~ ~ u l d  not be sufficient, since C 
is an interim1 attacker (someone A wantjs t o  commu- 
nicate with directly). A slight change is required: in 
message 3, A will sign not only the nonce but also the 
history of the protocol up to that point. This will en- 
sure that the signature and the protocol history are 
inseparable to  an internal attacker as well as to an 
external one. 
3. A + B: {CA, {Nt,,H3(CA,H2)}KL1}~ab 
where P in message 1 is the protocol identifier number 
and other protocol-~un identifying information (such 
;is network addressrs/ports). Also notice that in the 
sarrle message, K,,, acts as a nonce, in addition tlo 
bcing the session key. 
This solutior~ is si~rlilar in concept to  the one proposed 
in [PET]. The ciirrent version of SSL does not have 
this flaw. 
4 Application to stream proto- 
cols 
Our technique can be applicd to  stream protocols 
(such as TCP) [TCP] over packet switched networks 
such as the Internet. Instead of authenticating each 
individual packet separately [IPSEC] , we can authcn- 
ticate the whole data st,ream in the sanic way. How- 
ever, there are some issues that need to be addressed: 
The hash value should be calculated only over 
the invariant (between possible retransmissions) 
portions of the packet. Consequently, the under- 
lying network layers and infrastructure should 
riot modify the packet (or if they (lo, the remote 
end should reconstruct it in exactly the same 
form as it was transmitted). Under this rule, 
I P  [IP] packet fragmentation is permitted. 
User-application delivery of out  of sequence pack- 
ets is not permitted, since they cannot be au- 
thenticated before all previous packets have been 
received. This ordering requirement does not 
pose any problem, as it reflects the usual seman- 
tics of stream protocols. 
Acknowledgments do not mean that a packet was 
accepted as authenticated, but rather that it was 
received without any transmission errors. 
Only those portions of the packet that, are in- 
cluded in the hash value con~putation are con- 
sidered trustable. 
We believe that the best place do do this in the IP 
protocol stack is at  the TCP  layer. We would then ad- 
ditionally include in the hash computation the source 
and destination IP  addresses (which violates the lay- 
ering model) and create good random initial sequence 
numbers (which can be considered nonces). If used 
in other layers of a protocol stack (snch as the net- 
work or the application), it rnight be necessary to  
include additional information in the first message to  
make the protocol distinguishable from any other, or 
make sure that it does not interfere with the normal 
operation of the network (e.g. in the case of packet 
retransmissions). 
5 0 bservations and Discussion 
The method we showed in the previous section is a 
superset of message authentication. In the case of 
one message sent, the hash value is equivalent to  a 
MAC. For each successive message sent (in either di- 
rection), the check made by the receiver is equivalent 
to checking a MAC over the particular message and 
the receiver's state. So, for message X, the receiver 
checks the validity of message X and his local state. 
Since we assume that an attacker cannot modify the 
hash value in an undetectable way, changes made in 
messages X and X-1 (the previous message in the 
protocol run) will be detected in this check. Further- 
more, the state cannot be influenced by an attacker 
since an attempt to do so would have been detected 
in a previous step of the protocol. 
At any time, the local state depends on the messages 
sent and received a t  that point, the specific order they 
were sent in, the initiator's and responder's identities, 
a freshness identifier, a protocol identifier and a pro- 
tocol version number (all these were included in the 
first message only). Because of the required prop- 
erties of the hash function, duplication of all these 
fields in subsequent messages is not necessary. Addi- 
tionally, message sequence numbers are also not nec- 
essary, because inclusion of the state in the hash value 
computation ensures data sequencing. 
6 Conclusion 
We have presented a method of designing fail-stop 
protocols based on message-chaining. The method re- 
lies on a representation of the state of a cryptographic 
protocol in a secure hash value, and was demon- 
strated on a familiar cryptographic protocol, SSL, as 
a proof-of-concept example. The message-chaining 
idea of method is sufficiently general to  be applicable 
to non-cryptographic protocols, such as the Internet 
protocol for reliable datastreams, TCP. 
Ensuring that a protocol is fail-stop allows the de- 
signer to restrict his or her concerns to malicious 
insiders and passive (eavesdropping) attacks. Our 
method can be used to  construct efficient implemen- 
tations of such fail-stop protocols, as it neither greatly 
increases the size of the messages nor the number of 
cryptographic operations required. 
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